Kieran Setiya (Pittsburg, Philosophy) has posted Is Efficiency a Vice? on the web. Here is the abstract:
Argues against the form of instrumentalism on which being practically rational is being efficient in the pursuit of one's ends. The trait of means-end efficiency turns out to be a defect of character, and therefore cannot be identified with practical reason at its best.
And here is a bit more from the text of the paper:
This paper is about the peculiar ethics of means-end efficiency. It can present itself as an aspect of good character, so that its absence is a defect . . . . But it does not always do so. It is tempting tosay about the efficiency of the nasty person what Kant says about the “coolness of a scoundrel,” that it “makes him not only far more dangerous but also immediately more abominable in our eyes” (Kant 1785, Ak. 4: 394). When Aristotle writes about cleverness (deinotes), “which is such as to be able to do the actions that tend to promote whatever end is assumed and to attain them,” he takes the middle ground: “[if], then, the goal is fine, cleverness is praiseworthy, and if the goal is base, cleverness is unscrupulousness.” But is this right? After all, there is another kind of middle ground. We might argue, against the Aristotelian view, that effi ciency in itself is neither good nor bad. It is valuable as a means, not as a virtue or a vice.