Alesina, Ichino, & Karabarbounis on Gender Based Taxation

Alberto F. Alesina , Andrea Ichino and Loukas Karabarbounis (Harvard University - Department of Economics , European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO) and Harvard University - Department of Economics) have posted Gender Based Taxation and the Division Of Family Chores on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

Gender Based Taxation (GBT) satisfies Ramsey's optimal criterion by taxing less the more elastic labor supply of women. This holds when different elasticities between men and women are taken as exogenous and primitive. We study GBT in a model in which, instead, elasticity differences emerge endogenously from the bargained allocation of family duties. We explore two polar cases, which summarize the channels through which GBT affects an economy encompassing a wider set of possible reasons for gender differences. In the first case, the allocation of family chores is uneven between spouses because men have a superior bargaining power. In the second, instead, women take up more chores because they have a comparative advantage in household activities. We show how GBT emerges as an optimal policy tool as result of the interaction between incentives within the family and the Ramsey criterion, which is internalized by the government but not by household members.