Legal rules and regulations are routinely rationalized by appeal to the incentives they create. This Note examines a fact about incentives – namely, that they often "crowd out" such natural motivations of citizens to engage in socially valued behavior as a sense of civic duty, a commitment to personal growth, and charity towards others. The "crowding out effect" of incentives has traditionally been explained as problematic by appeal to cases where it renders incentives counter-productive – when fear of legal sanction or desire for financial reward substitutes for other forms of motivation in agents, this often leads to less of the socially valued behavior regulators sought to incentivize. In contrast, I explore whether the effect of legal incentives on our motivational psychology might be inherently regrettable in some cases, quite apart from the effect on behavioral outcomes. I show that a normative reframing of the crowding out effect that takes seriously the inherent value that resides in our "higher motives" generates novel insights into a variety of legal phenomena, including doctrinal rules in intellectual property, contracts, and torts; and a guiding theory for legal reformation, one that bears on the choice between rule- and standard-based legal directives, and the strategic use of the law to improve the way citizens conceptualize their obligations to each other.