This essay responds to three commentaries on my book, Elements of Moral Cognition, as part of a symposium that will be published in the Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies. The commentaries are:
Aaron Zimmerman, "Mikhail's Naturalized Moral Rationalism," 3 Jerusalem Rev. L. Stud. 1-22 (2013)
David Enoch, "On Analogies, Disanalogies, and Moral Philosophy: A Comment on John Mikhail's Elements of Moral Cognition," 3 Jerusalem Rev. L. Stud. 1-25 (2013)
Emmanuel Chemla, Paul Egré & Philippe Schlenker, "Moral Judgments and Semantic Judgments: A Case Study (Comments on Mikhail)," 3 Jerusalem Rev. L. Stud. 1-18 (2013)
The essay addresses a number of topics raised by these commentaries, including the debate between rationalism and empiricism; whether the Principle of Double Effect is necessary and sufficient to explain common moral intuitions; whether my trolley problem data are replicable; whether Rawls was a moral psychologist; substantive differences between moral intuitions and linguistic intuitions; whether my normative and metaethical assumptions are defensible; the role of idealization and statistical data in moral psychology; the distinction between categorical and gradient moral judgments; the role of probabilistic factors in moral judgment; and the relation between moral judgments and causal judgments.
And here is a link to Elements of Moral Cognition: Rawls' Linguistic Analogy and the Cognitive Science of Moral and Legal Judgment , a Legal Theory Bookworm selection.