Legal systems privilege plain language in their rules for interpreting statutes. If a principle goal of interpretation is to apply the law in a manner that is faithful to will of the legislature that enacted it, there can be no better evidence of legislative will, the argument goes, than the plain language that the legislature employed in its drafting. This chapter addresses two issues that this standard account leaves unaddressed. The first is what we mean when we speak of plain language. I argue here that language is plain when a speaker (writer) would mean only one thing by it and a hearer (reader) would understand only that same thing. If this perspective is correct, it means that when language is plain it is plain because the mental states of individual participants match each other with respect to the particular utterance or passage in question. That, in turn, means that one can be both concerned about questions of intent in construing statutory language, and still commit oneself to giving primary deference to the text. Much of the literature on statutory interpretation draws an improper divide between those who are concerned with intent, and others who rely on text. This perspective also suggests that, since text is only evidence of legislative intent, that there may be occasions, albeit only rare ones, in which there may be better evidence of intent than the language itself. Legislative errors are a particularly good instance. Finally, while the examples in this chapter come from American law, the problems discussed arise from the nature of our language faculty, suggesting that legal systems in general will encounter the same problems, even if they do not subscribe to the same solutions.