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April 15, 2008

Brooks on Plato & Democracy

Thom Brooks (University of Newcastle upon Tyne) has posted Is Plato's Political Philosophy Anti-Democratic? on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

Perhaps one of the most controversial figures in political philosophy is Plato. Today, he is both a leading figure of political philosophy's canon and yet he has virtually no defenders of his political philosophy. While his works, such as the Republic, are amongst the most celebrated texts in the field, his theory of the state garners little, if any, support. This essay is an attempt to help rehabilitate Plato's theory of the state.

Of the many reservations against this theory, the central problem today concerns Plato's rejection, even perhaps 'hatred', of democracy. Contemporary political philosophers argue that Plato accepts 'Guardianship' whereby all political power is controlled by a small elite in virtue of their superior knowledge of governance and, thus, the common citizenry are denied all political power. Plato's theory of the state is objectionable not simply because it is anti-democratic, but because the people lack any political power.

I argue for several positions. First, modern democracy can withstand Plato's criticisms of democracy, as Plato's critique is of Athenian democracy. Secondly, I argue that Plato can overcome Dahl's Guardianship objection as Plato's later, more mature work does not fail victim to Dahl's worries. Finally, I identify two central aspects of Plato's 'moderate authoritarianism' --- that (1) experts have a place in all legitimate governance and (2) only the people can have the final say over political matters --- and offer a general defence.

March 27, 2008

Hockett on Distributive Justice in Normative Legal Theory

Robert C. Hockett (Cornell University - School of Law) has posted Taking Distribution Seriously on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

It is common for legal theorists and policy analysts to think and communicate mainly in maximizing terms. What is less common is for them to notice that each time we speak explicitly of socially maximizing one thing, we speak implicitly of distributing another thing and equalizing yet another thing. We also, moreover, effectively define ourselves and our fellow citizens by reference to that which we equalize; for it is in virtue of the latter that our social welfare formulations treat us as "counting" for purposes of socially aggregating and maximizing.

To attend systematically to the inter-translatability of maximization language on the one hand, equalization and identification language on the other, is to "take distribution seriously." It is to recognize explicitly, and to trace the important normative consequences that stem from, the fact that all law and policy are as distributive and citizen-defining as they are aggregative. It is also to recognize therefore that all law and policy treat us as equals in some respects - respects in terms of which they identify and "count" us as politically relevant - and as non-equals in other respects. Attending explicitly to these "respects" brings transparency about the degrees to which our laws and policies identify, "count," and treat us as equals in the right respects.

This Article accordingly seeks to lay out with care how to take distribution seriously in legal and policy analysis. It does so by two means, keyed to the principal guises in which distribution is typically implicated in legal and policy analysis: First, by careful attention to the internal structures of the social welfare functions favored by most present-day legal theorists and policy analysts. And second, by systematic reference to what linguists call the "cognitive grammar" of non-formal distributive language, a structure that mirrors the structure of distribution itself. The payoffs include both a workable method by which systematically to test proposed maximization norms for their normative propriety, and an attractive distributive ethic that can serve as an ethically intelligible normative touchstone for legal and policy analysis.

Lot's of interesting stuff in this paper, which is recommended.  Because this paper covers so much ground, I have a number of questions that Hockett may intend to address in subsequent work.  For example, Hockett moves quickly through the major options for answering the "equality of what?" question, and leaves some positions off the table: especially noteworthy is his omission of the Sen-Nussbaum capacities approach--which is, in my opinion, the most promising theoretical line on the fundamental question of the proper shape of political equality.

Here is another passage to which I reacted.  Hockett is discussing Rawls's theory, justice as fairness, and he argues:

Rawls allows even the matter of “first bests” to remain undetectedly underspecified. We are left wondering whether there’s any “here” here. The theory so underdetermines its own implementation that we don’t know what to make of the theory itself – or, perhaps better put, what to make with it. How much is it actually telling us if it is equally realizable in any number of possible polities with radically divergent property, tort, contract, and other legal arrangements? Put differently, how do we recognize a Rawlsian society upon seeing one?

There is a lot of hand waving going on in this passage.  If Hockett means to assert that there are no criteria by which compliance with the two principles could be judged, then his claim is surely false.  It is indisputable that a wide variety of actual historical socities and imaginable forms of social organization would not comply with the two principles.  Perhaps what Hockett means to claim is that the two principles do not determine even the details of private and public law: if that were his claim it would be true of Rawls's theory, but it would also surely be true of Hockett's own view and every other general theory of distributive justice.

My own understanding of how Rawls stands with respect to private law is as follows.  The two principles of justice apply to the basic structure--to the constitutional essentials and other institutions such as the choice of the basic economic structure (socialism, welfare-capitalism, etc.).  So long as the basic structure satisfies the two principles, the details of these institutions can vary within broad limits.  For example, the institution of tort law would have to be designed so that they were consistent with the two principles.  Tort systems that would result in violations of the basic liberties or that would undermine the ability of the basic structure to satisfy the difference principle would be out of bounds, but this would allow for a wide range of variation on matters of detail.  The reason such variations are permitted is that the society has satisfied the requirements of justice as fairness: this means that other values, including decisions made through democratic processes and choices made by individuals and communities of voluntary association, take the stage.

So, "how do we recognize a Rawlsian society upon seeing one?"  The answer is that we would examine the operation of the basic structure in light of the two principles.  Our specific inquiries would include questions like: (1) does the constitution contain all of the consitutional essentials such as procedural due process, liberty of conscience, and an equal franchise? (2) does the basic form of economic organization satisfy the difference principle?  If we are satisfied on this score, then the work of justice as fairness has been done.  Of course, many important moral and political questions remain, but if Rawls's arguments for the basic structure as subject is correct, then these questions are not questions of distributive justice.  Or to put it different, the society is distributively justice however it answers the additional questions.

Read Hockett.

March 21, 2008

Kaplow on the Equality of What Debate

Louis Kaplow (Harvard Law School) has posted Primary Goods, Capabilities, . . . Or Well-Being? (Philosophical Review, Vol. 116, pp. 603-632, 2007) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Theories of distributive justice and of the aggregate social good typically require a method of assessing each individual's situation. Among the common measures are primary goods, capabilities, and well-being. This article advances the argument that approaches that focus on the means of fulfillment, where the means are multi-dimensional, are subject to an objection if advanced as ideal normative theories. In general, it is possible to raise every individual's well-being by deviating from the dictates of means-based theories. This result is problematic not only on welfarist grounds but also if freedom, autonomy, or consent is regarded to be important. It is suggested that means-based theories nevertheless have appeal, but for instrumental, not intrinsic reasons.

March 05, 2008

Nussbaum on Equal Liberty of Conscience

Check out Martha Nussbaum on "Equality Liberty of Conscience" via Brooks Blog!

February 25, 2008

Zwolinski on the Separateness of Persons

Matt Zwolinski (University of San Diego) has posted The Separateness of Persons and Liberal Theory on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The fact that persons are separate in some descriptive sense is relatively uncontroversial. But one of the distinctive ideas of contemporary liberal political philosophy is that the descriptive fact of our separateness is normatively momentous. John Rawls and Robert Nozick both take the separateness of persons to provide a foundation for their rejection of utilitarianism and for their own positive political theories. So why do their respective versions of liberalism look so different? This paper claims that the difference is based in Rawls' and Nozick's differing understandings of the morally significant aspects of personhood, and argues that respect for separateness is a value better suited to defend Nozickian libertarianism than Rawlsian liberalism.

And a bit more from the text:

Rawls’ decision to strip away these aspects of individuals leaves him in an odd position for one committed to respecting the separateness of persons. For once all the factors that Rawls deems as arbitrary have been hidden behind the veil of ignorance, there is nothing left to effectively differentiate individuals at all. The differences still exist, in some sense, but cannot play any role in the negotiations which take place behind the veil. The principles of justice which result from the original position are thus not really the product of a process of give-and-take compromise between different people with different interests. They are, as Rawls himself notes, essentially the result of one person’s choice – a person who, once cleansed of all morally arbitrary factors, is exactly the same as everyone else.38 A hypothetical contract between different individuals has the appearance of taking separateness seriously, but with Rawls’ theory the appearance is only superficial. And this merely superficial respect for separateness explains many of the most damning criticisms which have been brought against Rawls’ theory from both ends of the political spectrum.

Very nice piece--although I'm not sure I agree with the conclusion.  Highly recommended.

May 15, 2007

Cox & Pildes on the Intertemporal Dimension of Voting Rights

Over at the Virginia Law Review's In Brief, there is a marvelous exchange between Adam Cox & Rick Pildes:

The Temporal Dimension of Voting Rights
Essay by Adam B. Cox

What Kind of Right is "the Right to Vote"?
Response by Richard H. Pildes

Both pieces play off Cox's article, The Temporal Dimension of Voting Rights by Adam B. Cox. Here is an abstract:

Modern voting rights scholarship agrees on one thing: voting rights are in large part aggregate rights. Accordingly, one cannot evaluate voting rights claims, or the fairness of the electoral system, without establishing the boundaries of appropriate aggregation. This framework has led the literature to focus on spatial aggregation. That is, commentators concentrate on when it is appropriate to aggregate across persons located in different places to determine the fairness (or constitutionality) of a voting rule. Almost entirely overlooked, however, is the possibility of temporal aggregation. To evaluate the fairness of a voting rule, one must also pick a time period across which to aggregate the collective treatment of individual voters. This Article explores the temporal dimension of voting rights, showing that temporal aggregation issues play a central but unexamined role in many voting rights disputes, including the partisan gerrymandering cases recently decided by the Supreme Court. In addition, the Article highlights the importance of temporal aggregation for a number of concrete disputes in voting rights theory and doctrine. Understanding the temporal dimension of voting rights expands the available strategies for incorporating minority voices into legislative assemblies, provides a new perspective on the debates over partisan gerrymandering, and helps reconcile disagreements over the appropriate role of competition in the electoral process.

Rawls in the News

Well, sort of.  Check out The Philosopher of Our Times by Steven B. Smith in the New York Sun.  A taste:

Rawls's ambition was to re-establish the grand tradition of political philosophy at a time when it was widely considered moribund. It had become either something called "the history of political thought" which examined political ideas in their historical context, or a branch of "analytical philosophy" which was based on the minute linguistic and logical analysis of concepts. The publication of "A Theory of Justice" had the virtue of breathing new life into a dying field. Rawls turned back to the social contract tradition of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and especially Immanuel Kant in order to derive substantive principles of justice that could provide a defense of a more democratic social order.

October 17, 2006

New at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philsoophy

Check out some of the new & revised entries at the wonderful Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

Citizenship by Dominique Leydet

Children's Rights by David William Archard

Federalism by Andreas Follesdal

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