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June 26, 2008

Beebe on Fair Use & Judicial Ideology

Barton Beebe (Cardozo Law School) has posted Does Judicial Ideology Affect Copyright Fair Use Outcomes?: Evidence from the Fair Use Case Law (Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2008) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

This brief article reports the results of an empirical study of the effect, if any, of judicial ideology on outcomes in fair use case law. The data set for the study consists of all reported federal court opinions that made substantial use of the section 107 four-factor test for adjudicating the defense of fair use from the January 1, 1978 effective date of the Copyright Act through 2005, and includes, for each judge casting a vote in these opinions, the judge's values from various widely-accepted indices of judicial ideology. The study finds that judicial ideology has no significant effect on fair use outcomes - and concludes that this is not necessarily an encouraging outcome.

And from the conclusion:

It may be encouraging to learn that copyright fair use is not an area of the law in which judicial ideology appears to influence adjudication—and thus that copyright fair use is an exception to Sag, Jacobi, and Stych’s more general findings that judicial ideology affects intellectual property outcomes, at least before the Supreme Court.34 Yet one might tentatively observe that there is also something disturbing about these results. They are disturbing because copyright fair use should be ideological. As intellectual property scholars have long recognized, the stakes involved in fair use adjudication are immense. Fair use outcomes define the contours of the private and public domains of human expression and, in doing so, directly impact our capability for human flourishing.35 Fair use is far more than an economic area of the law calling for the post-ideological balancing of costs and benefits; it goes to the core of what constitutes a good society.36 Thus, while the “politics of intellectual property”37 that James Boyle and others called for many years ago apparently has yet to make itself felt among the ranks of the federal judiciary, one might tentatively hope that some future study of this nature may yield different results.

April 09, 2008

Wilson on the Quantitative Ideology Models of Judiicial Behavior

Sean Wilson (Penn State) has posted On the Problems of Political Science and the Nonsense of Quantitative Ideology Models on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Quantitative scholars of the Court purport to be engaged in empirical science. Yet, the great majority of works regarded as elite within the political science social network are deficient in one fundamentally critical way: their works do not generate scientific vocabulary. The key feature of science is that it creates a reductionist vocabulary that rigidly designates some phenomenon in the external world (e.g., water is H2O). Words like politics and ideology are not scientific terms. They do not rigidly designate. This causes or contributes to serious disciplinary problems. If scholars want to scientize their field, they have to begin jargonizing their phenomena of interest in the external world.

Of particular concern are the works in judicial politics that purport to study the influence of ideology on judicial decision making. Scholarship in this area routinely suffers from the following flaws: (1) the inability of the scholarly community to agree about what phenomenon in the external world its empirical works actually observe; (2) the adoption of perspective science that works not unlike certain forms of creation science; (3) the use of adversarial or group-driven author citation in journal articles; (4) the frequent deployment of reification; and (5) the practice of studying something in the external world with techniques that do not allow counterfactuals to exist.

Moreover, any scholar who constructs a quantitative model with ideology as an independent variable is engaging in a kind of nonsense or rhetoric. This is because quantitative methods cannot be used to demonstrate that a person's beliefs or actions are caused by ideology. This is because when the concept of ideology is deployed as a causal assertion, its grammar offers only normative criticism. Science can no more directly observe ideology in this sense of talking than it can concepts like integrity or virtue. The best that ideology scholars can ever hope for, therefore, is good normative criticism. Although behaviorism can contribute to a normative discussion, the simple fact is that quantitative models simply cannot ever directly estimate the effect that ideology has on beliefs or behavior, because this is fundamentally a normative conclusion.

I'm not sure I agree with Wilson's understanding of "science"--which is unduly narrow, but this is a good read and certainly provocative.

April 08, 2008

Law on Judicial Power

David S. Law (University of San Diego - School of Law) has posted A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Judicial review has long been characterized by constitutional scholars as countermajoritarian and antidemocratic. This Article employs insights from political science and game theory to argue that precisely the opposite is true: the relationship between judicial power and popular rule is not antagonistic, but symbiotic. Constitutional courts with the power of judicial review perform monitoring and coordination functions that are crucial to the maintenance of popular sovereignty. By conveying relevant information about government misconduct in a highly public fashion, constitutional courts enable the people to exercise control over the government in an informed and coordinated manner. The fact that constitutional courts perform monitoring and coordinating functions helps, in turn, to solve the puzzle of why governments obey them. Their ability to mobilize the people against the government means that government disobedience of the courts carries potentially severe consequences.

Judicial review supports popular sovereignty by mitigating the principal-agent problem that lies at the heart of democratic government. In a system of constitutional government premised upon popular sovereignty, the people institute and delegate power to a government and may impose terms and conditions in the form of a constitution. The government, as the agent of the people, is supposed to exercise its power consistent with those terms and conditions. But the interests of principal and agent may diverge: those entrusted with public power may seek to seize more power than has been given them, or to turn the power they have been given against the people themselves. The people, as collective principal, thus face the challenge of asserting effective control over a potentially treacherous government. A constitution ordinarily sets forth mechanisms by which they may exercise such control peacefully, but these are not immune to sabotage and failure. In extreme cases of constitutional failure, the people may band together to overthrow a government that has blocked the ordinary mechanisms of popular control. There are, however, significant potential obstacles to any effective exercise of popular power over the government. First is an information problem: the people cannot respond to bad behavior by the government if they remain unaware of that behavior. Second is a coordination problem: even if the people acting together are capable of replacing the government, such action may require widespread coordination that can be difficult to achieve.

Constitutional courts facilitate the exercise of popular control over the government in two ways. First, they provide reliable, low-cost information about the constitutionality of government conduct. A court engaged in judicial review performs the function of a whistleblower or fire alarm: it warns the people whether their government has overstepped the bounds of its delegated power. Second, courts can coordinate popular action against usurping governments. People are unlikely to act openly against a tyrannical government unless they believe that others will act as well. What they need, therefore, is a signal that it is time to act. A court can provide such a signal by ruling publicly against the government.

And from the text:

[C]ourts can shape our predictive beliefs, or our expectations about how others will behave. The essence of strategic behavior is to act in ways that anticipate the behavior one expects from others. Our predictions regarding the behavior of others inform our strategic calculations as to the costs and benefits of different courses of action. A judicial decision that changes our expectations about how others will behave thus influences our own behavior as well. In choosing how to behave in light of a judicial decision, a strategic actor must take into account how she expects others to respond to the decision. Her calculations as to how others will react may lead her to comply with the decision, regardless of whether she finds the decision either factually informative or normatively persuasive. By generating predictive beliefs about the behavior of others, courts can induce rational actors to comply with their decisions. The expectation that others will punish us for defying the courts, for example, has traditionally provided a strong incentive to obey the courts in the first place. Suppose, for example, that A sues B for intentional infliction of emotional distress and wins a damages award. The judgment may have no effect on B’s factual belief that she inflicted no harm on A, or on her normative belief that her behavior was wholly justified. The fact that the court has entered a judgment against her, however, leads her to believe that others–including, but not limited to, the court itself–will inflict various costs on her if she refuses to pay A as ordered. It is B’s predictive beliefs about the consequences of the decision, as opposed to her factual or normative beliefs, that lead her to comply.

I commented on this important paper last week at MPSA (the Midwest Political Science Association).  Law is developing an original an important theory of judicial power.  This paper is really a must.  If you are interested in the intersection of law and positive political theory, you will be able to see the importance of this paper from the abstract, but if you are not familiar with that tradition, Law's paper provides a window into a very important approach to fundamental issues.  Although the surface of the paper is concerned with judicial review, this theoretical implications ramify throughout legal theory.

Highly recommended.  Download it while its hot!

March 31, 2008

Halfteck on Legislative Threats

Guy Halfteck (Harvard University - John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business) has posted Legislative Threats (Stanford Law Review, Vol. 61, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

This Article introduces a theory of legislative threats, which not only pierces the fundamental construction of the legal system as a social regulatory institution but, more fundamentally, shows that the conventional wisdom on the role of the legal system in achieving and maintaining social order cannot explain how social control actually works in modern society. Contrary to received wisdom, the theory demonstrates that the threat of legislation, rather than legislation itself, plays a remarkable role in controlling behavior, in creating and setting incentives, and in maintaining social order.

Conceptually, legislative threats encompass threats that legislators exert on target entities - including banks and financial institutions, manufacturing corporations, professions, industrial sectors and trade bodies, universities and other public institutions, and federal agencies and U.S. states - according to which the legislator will exercise her legislative power and enact adverse legislation to regulate the conduct in question unless the threat-recipients modify their conduct in line with the legislator's demands. Implicit in the threat is the inverse promise that the legislator will forgo the threatened legislation if, and only if, threat-recipients duly meet these demands. The Article examines ten case studies drawn from diverse areas of social policy, which demonstrate both the pervasive use of threats and their formidable regulatory capacity. The Article also offers an analytic taxonomy that delineates the conceptual boundaries of legislative threats and enhances the precision of the analytic inquiry: this taxonomy includes explicit, implicit, and anticipatory legislative threats.

The Article borrows tools and insights from the field of game theory to model the strategic interaction between legislators and target firms as a non-cooperative game. This model yields clear and insightful predictions regarding the inducement effect of legislative threats - namely, the capacity of legislative threats to induce target entities to modify their behavior so as to avert the risk and consequences of the threatened legislation. The inducement effect, it is shown, depends on: (i) the credibility condition - namely, whether threat-recipients believe that the threat is credible or, rather, mere cheap talk; and (ii) the effectiveness condition - that is, whether the perceived probability that the threatened legislation will be enacted into law is sufficiently high. The analysis also demonstrates how legislators' commitments, reputation, and motivations affect the credibility of threats and, consequently, their inducement effect on the conduct of target firms.

Because threats are often directed towards groups as a whole (rather than a single firm), the Article explains the counter-intuitive effects of strategic interaction within groups on compliance with such threats (giving special attention is given to homogenous or heterogeneous as well organized or unorganized ones). In this respect, the Article develops the claim that compliance with legislative threats is, essentially, an informal political bargain in which a legislator barters the non-use of legislative power (with respect to a particular issue) in return for firms' commitment to change their conduct. Thus, by focusing on bargaining in the shadow of legislative threats, the Article identifies two important, inter-related effects: (i) exerting legislative threats elicits valuable information from target entities, which in turn reduces transaction costs, facilitates efficient regulatory bargaining, and decreases the contractual incompleteness of the regulatory bargain; (ii) regulatory bargaining provides an opportunity to craft superior measures that are necessary to effectively address the issues at stake with respect to which the legislator directed the threat in the first place.

Highly recommended.

January 11, 2008

Blogging from SPSA in New Orleans

Introduction

I’m at the Southern Political Science Association meeting in New Orleans. Legal academics sometimes forget that there is a parallel universe of legal scholarship in the world of political science (or “politics” or “government”), done from a diverse array of methodological perspectives—ranging from the formal models of positive political theory to old-fashioned attitudinalism to what is sometimes called “the new institutionalism.”

I’m attending a panel entitled “Formal Theory and Judicial Politics.” James Rogers of Texas A & M is chairing the panel & the other participants are Cornell Clayton (Washington State) and Jeffrey K. Stanton (Florida State). The format is a “roundtable discussion,” so there are no formal papers. I’m going to report some impressions of the speaker’s remarks, but given the format, my liveblogging will be even more impressionistic and sketchy than usual. These are my thoughts about the panel and not even close to a transcript. One more thing: I participated extensively in the questions and answers after the panel, but I was not able to blog my own remarks and exchanges with the panelists.

Rogers begins by introducing the panel. He explains that each speaker, including himself, will make a few remarks, followed by conversation among the panelists and with those in the audience.

Cornell Clayton

Clayton begins by explaining that he is not a formalist. His role is to express a skeptical or Clayton critical view. He is not as hostile as some might think, but he does have some questions. He is reluctant to engage in abstract debates about method. As a methodological pluralist, he tends to think that the question of methods should always be secondary to research subject. The process of theory building ought to be an iterative process. There is a world of difference between theory laden and theory driven research (referring to Ian Shapiro’s distinction); research should never be theory drive. Cherry picking data or advancing nonfalsifiable hypothesis is simply bad science.

We should always embrace a self-critical attitude toward our methods. The question of what value is added should be front and center. Because formal theory has high access costs, those who engage in it have a special burden to explain what the value added is. Clayton discusses a paper he heard from the formal approach with 64 pages of dense formal apparatus that suggested that supermajority rules dampen special interests. His reaction was, “Have you heard of James Madison”?

Far from being opposed to formal approaches, he thinks they have much to offer. He sees rational choice theory broadly—it is explains behavior in terms of goals. What makes rational choice theory exciting is that it places human agency at the center of consideration. Humans are motivated actors who interrelate with one another—this is the key to considering human behavior.

He questions formal work that fails to take human motivation seriously. Some time ago, Clayton and Howard Gillman edited two volumes on Supreme Court decisionmaking. At that time, they suggested that examination of motivations was welcome. But they questioned whether formal approaches that borrowed the attitudinalist approach to motivation would work. The new wave of strategic choice literature was different because it looked at motivations. The first wave recognized that judges cared about legal rules, judicial role, and other non-policy preference. Beginning in the late 80s and 90s, a second wave of strategic choice scholars developed more complex models, but they substituted the attitudinalist model of motivation for the more complex story of the first wave. Most of this formal work cited Segal and Spaeth, and some saw these formal approaches as generalizing the attitudinal model.

Obviously in some cases the attitudinal model has explanatory force. Gillman and Clayton argued that the attitudinal model was flawed. The attitudinalists were attacking a strawman version of the legal model. In the post-realist world, no one thinks law is just black letter law. Historical institutional scholars (Whittington, Gillman, etc.) have demonstrated that judicial preferences are more complex than attitudinalists permit them to be. So the second wave went off in a direction that Clayton sees as misguided. Judges do not calculate who the median member of Congress is.

The formal models lack resonance in the real world of experience. They are “just so stories,” implausible stories of what is really going on. What is promising is the third wave of strategic research. Rather than assuming an unrealistic dichotomy, these stories tell a more a complex story about judicial motivation (Tom Ginsburg’s work, etc.). The most exciting work will focus on the unbundling of the idea of motivation. In doing this it is likely the research will draw new linkage with normative, historical scholars. Recent research by institutionalists who are interested in understanding how political regimes affect courts and judges have used strategic frameworks.

Clayton's presentation was insightful and effective--and I agree with much of what he had to say.

Jeffrey Stanton

Stanton will address the role of formal theory in comparative politics. He will also talk aboutStanton  the value of formal theory as a method. And finally, he will discuss the value of formal or mathematical approaches.

Stanton begins that it is not very useful to ask what formal theory has uniquely contributed to our substantive understanding. Formal theory does not develop independently of nonformal theory. It is unhelpful to think about the research tradition. It is ultimately about core problems. It is insulting to nonformal theorists to focus on what is unique. Formal theory is a method. It would be like asking what computational linguistics contributed.

Formal theory is a method that applies to any positive theory of politics. There is always some use to formal theory. Most positive theories of behavior have a few things in common. They identify actors, what they care about, what they know, what they can and can’t do. Formal theory just does this. What actors care about are represented by functions. What they can do are their strategies. We can define their information construct. So this can be applied to any argument. It is a method for producing consistent predictions. It is useful for insuring that predictions are consistent.

So here are some examples of formal theory from comparative studies. What are the conditions under which you can constrain the state? Or you identify a problem, torture, and ask how institutions can solve that problem. Consider the first example, constraining the state by law. In the early 1980s, judges in Argentina started ruling against those who appointing them. Why did they do this? The argument is that they anticipated the fall of the regime, and they were trying to convince the new government that they (the judges) were worth keeping around. It is a neat story, but why would the new regime keep them around. And why wouldn’t the judges recognize this? You need to answer those questions, which Gretchen does in her book.

Tom Ginsburg’s work is another example. Why are constitutional courts established? How do they acquire power? Tom’s argument is that ruling coalitions use courts as an insurance policy against future electoral loss. After a court is constructed, they initially don’t have a lot of power and must be very careful. They transition into a phase where they have much more power. There is a tension between the two arguments. If you want insurance, it is not clear that lower power courts have the power to do that. (At this point, Stanton quotes an extended passage from Ginsburg’s work, which I won’t try to reconstruct.) Stanton suggests that some of the questions that Ginsburg’s work raises can be answered by formal models.

James Rogers

Rogers has noticed that there is some loose language in discussions of these issues. There Rogers is a difference between several different approaches. Rational choice models do not need to be formal. Many writers apply soft rational choice, approaches, e.g., Madison. In this sense, someone who thinks they are Napoleon can be rational so long as he can rank preferences and his ranking is transitive. This is a very thin notion of rationality. There is a lot of human behavior that is irrational—choice are not consistent or choices are flummoxed or choices are based on intransitive preferences. It is fine for psychologists to explain irrational choices. But if there is a field of activity that can be explained on the basis of rational choice, then the models have space.

Formal models do not need to be rational choice models. You can stipulate any kind of behavior. You can formalize rational choice easily, but there is no requirement that mathematics serve rational choice.

Game theoretic models only require interaction, or more strictly, dependence of one actor’s action on another actor’s action. To the extent that what I do depends on what others do is “strategic.” Game theory does not require awareness of the game. Game theory may be best when things are so internalized that we are unaware of it. I drive on the right hand side of the road, which can be explained by game theory, even though I don’t think it through in game theoretic terms. Hence, it is irrelevant that judges don’t think they are policy motivated. But of course, policy motivation may not be the only thing in the utility function.

Decision theoretic models are game theoretic models with one person dealing with an environment. Public choice includes a normative aspect that game theorists don’t need to accept.

We need to categorize in order to distinguish things, but there is a continuum—from prosaic theory (in prose) moving on a continuum to more or less formal theory. Most formal theory papers explain what is going on in prose. There is a continuum from purely verbal to a line with points to greek letters and the like. The question is what is the benefit of different sorts of abstraction. The idea that it is “us versus them” is not helpful.

Given the costs, formal theory needs to be justified. Quite often Rogers gets papers were there is a sensible idea that is formalized, and his response is “who care?” Translating something that can be understood without the math into formal terms is not worthwhile. There is no public reason to mathematize for the sake mathematization. There is a temptation to write for the sake of fun, but that is what the review system is for.

Why is formal theory valuable? “Unrealism” is valuable in some situations. If I were to lay out a map to get us from here to the hotel, and someone said it is not a realistic representation of the world, he would say, “but that is the point to having a map.” There are good maps and bad maps. A bad map would have way too much detail. You need just enough technical detail to get the insight. So unrealism isn’t a vice, it is a whole point. Verbal models abstract as well. In order to understand reality, we need to break it down.

There is “extended theorizing.” There are cases in which formalizing allows a longer chain of reasoning. There is a cost; we need to throw details away, but that is required.

The question of policy motivation—Rogers agrees and disagrees with Clayton. When Rogers got into the business, he was excited by the scholarship. Most of the scholars moved the policy space from legislation and moved it over to the judiciary. That was insensitive to the behavioral aspects of judicial politics. The critics tend to reify a stage of modeling development—perfect information and policy motivation—and then suggest it is unrealist. Rogers agrees, but at the same time those models were a first step. The insight that judges can act just like other politicians is important. Can we account for “sublimated behavior.” It is fun and useful to see how far we can push the simple assumptions.

So Rogers has a paper that assumes judges are legislators in robes. The assumption that when we allow judges to behave as Lochnerian judges, policy outcomes are better than if we require them to be deferential judges. The interaction of self-interested actors carves out a space for economic liberty. This is “fun and interesting.” That being said, an assumption is only an assumption. If it doesn’t work, then you abandon the assumption. Critics seem to be unaware of the evolutionary nature of formal theory. An example of this is the way that models now can account for uncertainty.

Discussion

Clayton suggest that he agrees with almost everything Stanton and Rogers say. He agrees formal theory is different than rational choice. He agrees that models do not need to be consciously aware of what they are doing. How do these norms become so internalized that we don’t think of them? Many studies are part of the process of scientific inquiry: you must deal with problems that are internal to the theory. His concern is that sometimes we lose sight of the point that the point of internal work is to deal with the external.

Alec Ewald if we asked actors such as Senators why they take positions in nomination hearings, they would own up to certain nominations. Honest judges have been socialized to say they are not maximizing their policy preferences. Rogers is open to the “false consciousness” claim. He has a law degree & interacts with scholars who love the Supreme Court and are emotionally wedded to a certain view of what judges do. Because law is a system of authorized coercion, we can’t tell the truth to ourself. He is open to the possibility that judges are just achieving policy goals. Rogers agrees with Clayton that the case has not yet been made.

Clayton says that many formal modelers keep motivation as an open hypothesis. As a matter of theory, the question of motivation must be prior to interaction. Rogers What is an implausible motivation and why? Clayton So if that goes into an interactive model, it is implausible. It is implausible, because it has an implausible distinction between legal and political preferences. At the heart of model, is a distinction between legal and political preferences. Dichotomizing adopts an unrealistic view of law. Rogers Is it wrong to have one dimension?

I asked a question at this point, which is omitted here.

Clayton and Rogers had a discussion about the role of policy preferences. Rogers thinks that the attempt to model based on policy preferences still has some play.

Another question from the floor related an experience where someone who had served as a law clerk for a trial judge was given authority to decide cases with almost no supervision from the federal judge for whom she clerked.

Some Reflections

I’m an outsider to this debate. Although I frequently attend political science meetings, present papers, and even do some modeling, my primary interests and methodological orientations are not those of political scientists. Nonetheless, I am deeply interested in the debates between and among political scientists about the role of rational choice theory, thick historical description, legal doctrine, and other approaches.

I am of more than one mind about the methodology debates among law and courts scholars. First, and perhaps foremost, I am a methodological pluralist. In other words, I believe that different problems are amenable to different methodologies and some problems are best understood if approached from multiple points of view. For example, if we are interested in understanding the behavior of the United States Supreme Court, I believe that formal, rational choice models have a contribution to make, but so does conventional legal theory (doctrinalism), normative constitutional theory, history, and so forth. This might seem uncontroversial, but I am not so sure. In panels like the one from which I am blogging, everyone is anxious to appear reasonable and respectful of their methodological opponents. But when the various groups meet among themselves more extreme and strident views emerge. You may have heard the various refrains: “Formal rational choice theory is simplistic bullshit dressed up in fancy mathematical clothes.” “New institutionalism is for people who can’t do math.” Well let me join in the casting of aspersions: “Methodological monism is myopic.” Now that’s a slogan I can get behind.

Second, I am a great believer in the value of some positive political theory, rational choice, and game theoretic models for understanding political institutions in general and the interaction among courts and between courts and other political institutions. Let me give just one example, I am very interested in the politics of judicial selection, and in particular, with the question whether formalist judges (assuming such persons could exist) could be selected given realistic assumptions about American politics. In the course of thinking about this question, I tried to conceptualize the politics of nomination in a two dimensional space (with a left-to-right political ideology line and a bottom-to-top judicial philosophy line (on which realism and formalism) are plotted). Positive political theory models of the judicial selection process are very helpful in this enterprise; thick descriptions can be helpful too, but they don’t get at my problem in a rigorous and clear way.

Third, nonetheless, I am in great sympathy with Cornell Clayton’s remarks in this panel. Let me express my concern this way. Let us assume that law does constrain judicial decisions at least in part because some judges have internalized the a value of fidelity to law and because some outcomes are legally correct and some are legally incorrect—even for a court of last resort. This does not entail that politics will play no role in judicial decisions. Some legal provisions are ambiguous (they have more than one possible legally-justifiable meaning. Others are vague (they have borderline cases). Judge’s beliefs about political morality (or their political ideology) could influence the resolution of vagueness in at least two ways. First, many conventional normative theories of judicial decisionmaking allow for explicit reference to such concerns. One example is Dworkin’s theory, which would allow beliefs about political morality in as part of the process by which Hercules constructs theory that best fits and justifies the law as a whole. A simpler view is that judges have discretion when there is ambiguity or vagueness and they are authorized to refer to their beliefs about political morality when they exercise this discretion. Second, the values or ideology of a judge could have a causal influence on decisions in cases where there is vagueness, ambiguity, or discretion, even if the judge believes that this influence is improper and should be minimized. For example, a judge might believe that she is obligated to apply consensus community values to resolve vagueness, even if she herself does not share these values.

In other words, law can constrain outcomes even if values (beliefs about political morality or political ideology) has an influence outside the constraints and at the margins of constraint. This is Hart’s familiar picture of the “core” and the “penumbra,” and I have put this point in terms of the distinction between underdeterminacy, determinacy, and indeterminacy of law. At some level, I think this picture is widely accepted, although there are some serious scholars who continue to adhere to the radical indeterminacy thesis—that law imposes no constraints on outcomes.

The fact that law underdetermines outcomes is especially important when we focus on courts of last resort in multitier appellate systems, e.g., the United States Supreme Court. The decision not to settle (or give up) and pursue a petition for certiorari and/or an appeal as of right may be made in part on the basis of uncertainty about the content of the law. If this is so, then we would expect the caseload of the Supreme Court to be systematically biased in favor of cases in which considerations of morality or politics have a wide scope. But this would not entail the conclusion that the Supreme Court as an institution is disposed to decide every possible case on the basis of morality or politics. Instead, we would expect that the court would decide “easy cases” on the basis of formal legal considerations, but that it rarely (perhaps almost never) gets an opportunity to do so.

What concerns me about some (but not all) attitudinal and rational choice, formal models of judicial behavior is that they do not acknowledge the complexity of the relationship between law and morality (or politics) in judicial decision. Of course, simplified assumptions are part of the normal machinery of formal models (and informal models as well). So it isn’t the fact of simplification that is a problem, it is the failure to acknowledge the limitations on these assumptions when interpreting the models and empirical work that tests the models.

This was an excellent session with interesting presentations and great discussion among the panelists.

May 03, 2007

Law & the Emotions Conference Website

The conference website from the "Law and the Emotions" Conference at UC Berkeley, with papers is now available at this website:

https://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/csls/lawemotion_conference/

For the papers:

https://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/csls/lawemotion_conference/program.html

And for links to additional papers:

https://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/csls/lawemotion_conference/papers.html

March 19, 2007

Shifting Politics of the Justices at Northwestern's Colloquy

Over at Northwestern's Colloquy, there is a terrific discussion of recent empirical work on "ideological drift" on the Supreme Court.

Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important? By Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn, and Jeffrey A. Segal

Justices Who Change: A Reply to Epstein et al. By Linda Greenhouse

Another teriffic Colloquy!

Continue reading "Shifting Politics of the Justices at Northwestern's Colloquy" »

August 15, 2006

Cross, Smith, and Tomarchio on Cohesions in Supreme Court Precedent

Frank B. Cross , Thomas A. Smith and Antonio Tomarchio (University of Texas at Austin - Department of Management Science & Information Systems , University of San Diego School of Law and Politecnico di Milano) have posted Determinants of Cohesion in the Supreme Court's Network of Precedents on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

This study examines determinants of cohesion in the Supreme Court's reliance on precedent in the network of U.S. Supreme Court precedents. We use a database of all Supreme Court Citations and test several measures of annualized Court action as independent variables in a regression on several measures of network cohesion. We find that the magnitude of ideological decisionmaking is consistently associated with a reduction in network cohesion, suggesting that there is indeed a conflict between legal application of precedent and ideological decisions. This effect was roughly the same, though, regardless of whether the Court was conservative or liberal. We also find significant independent effects for Chief Justice eras, with the Burger Court associated with greater cohesion and the Rehnquist Court associated with lessened cohesion.

And here is a bit more from the conclusion:

Our study has found some significant effects on the Supreme Court’s network of precedent. Greater ideological decisionmaking undermines the cohesion of the legal network, though the direction of that ideology (liberal vs. conservative) does not have a material effect. This documents the conflict between ideology and decisionmaking according to precedent. The two most recent courts had dramatic effects on the network. The Burger Court substantially enhanced some measures network cohesion, perhaps by integrating the recent Warren Court decisions into the existing network more seamlessly. The Rehnquist Court’s negative effect on network cohesion suggests a more revolutionary effort by the justices, perhaps to diminish the effect of the Warren Court decisions as precedents.

These findings should also inform the normative debate over the role of precedent in judicial decisions. One might assume that greater network cohesion is a preferable state, for the various reasons employed to defend the use of precedent. Greater reliance on precedent in judicial decisionmaking is commonly commended as increasing the stability of the law, with attendant values such as the facilitation of private ordering. Other benefits of precedent following include efficiency, judicial legitimacy, and fairness. Of course, for those who are skeptical of the Court’s reliance on precedent, greater cohesion might be considered disadvantageous.

Highly recommended.

August 11, 2006

Wilson on the Attitudinal Model

Sean Wilson has posted The Attitudinal Model, Political Science, Ecological Fallacy and Exaggeration on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Empirical scholars of the United States Supreme Court, Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth, have long contended that Supreme Court decisions are based primarily upon the ideological beliefs of the justices, and that ideology alone accounts for the bulk of choices made in civil liberties cases. However, this conclusion results from the misinterpretation of an ecological regression model. The researchers never modeled the votes of the justices; they only analyzed an index of grouped aggregates. When announcing conclusions, however, scholars equated variation in a voting index with the frequency distribution of binary observations that comprised it. As a result, model conclusions were exaggerated and disciplinary misinformation was created. This work exposes and corrects this problem by re-estimating the relationship between justice ideology and votes with a multilevel approach that uses a logistic regression to directly examine the dependent variable prior to its manipulation into grouped data. The findings demonstrate that ideology models lose about two-thirds of the level of explanation researchers previously proclaimed. This new understanding supports a more limited critique of the role that ideology plays on the Court – one that has a long history in political science that predates the more value-dominant “attitudinal” framework.

August 02, 2006

Cross & Smith on Network Analysis of the Impact of the "Reagan Revolution"

Frank Cross (Texas) and Tom Smith (San Diego) have posted The Reagan Revolution in the Network of Law on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

This paper analyzes the effect of the Rehnquist Court on Supreme Court precedent, using a network of all Court citations to other Supreme Court cases. Network analysis enables a study of the Court's use of precedent that may not be readily visible. We find that the Rehnquist Court has made a dramatic alteration in the network of precedent and, in the process, set the stage for a potentially revolutionary change in the makeup of the law.

And a bit more from conclusion of the paper:

The evidence from the network of Supreme Court decisions reveals a distinct effect of the Reagan Revolution in the Rehnquist Court. The court disrupted the network of precedents that had built up over decades. From our broader view of the forest, the precise implications of this disruption cannot be determined from this data; that would take a finer grained analysis that examined the fate of individual cases (trees). The fact that the effect of the Court shows up much more clearly in the network of law than in casual observation of particular decisions suggests that the Court was laying a foundation for long range change in the law, not trying to remake it overnight. This is consistent with research indicating that the law moves incrementally, via marginal adjustments. Changing the background legal network may be predicate for setting the path of law in the future, though the significance of those changes may not be immediately obvious. By this measure, the Reagan Revolution appears to have succeeded.

To have ultimate effect, however, the foundation must be built upon. A detailed study of prison reform litigation thus found that legal change happened gradually, as precedents slowly and steadily accumulated. That study concluded that “doctrine constrains as one element in a dynamic, interacting process; the need to maintain contact with existing doctrine, to stretch it without snapping it, is one of several conditions for effective judicial policy making.” The Rehnquist Court’s stretching and restructuring of the preexisting network of precedent may have established the basis for future courts of similar alignment to alter the content of the law to a greater degree than did the Rehnquist Court itself.

Highly recommended.  If you haven't yet read a paper that uses "network analysis," to examine citation networks, this is a good one to start with.  This is an important technique and as Cross and Smith show, it allows us to see familiar facts in new ways.  Download it while its hot!

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