John Bronsteen , Christopher J. Buccafusco and Jonathan S. Masur (Loyola University Chicago School of Law , University of Illinois College of Law , University of Chicago - Law School) have posted Welfare as Happiness on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
In the fields of law, economics, and philosophy, the leading conception of human welfare is preference-satisfaction - getting what one wants. An important rival is an objective list approach to ethics - possessing an enumerated set of capabilities. This Article argues against both major views and in favor of a third, defining welfare as subjective well-being - feeling good. We reject the leading approach on the ground that preferences are often mistaken or else involve goals independent of the individual's own welfare. When sophisticated preference-satisfaction theories launder out such preferences, those accounts reduce to our happiness-based approach. We reject objective list theories on the ground that they impose objective criteria, whereas an individual's well-being is a purely subjective concept. How good a person's life is for her cannot be judged by how well she satisfies someone else's standards of virtue or flourishing. By contrast with these theories, our hedonic approach captures the ordinary understanding of what it means for someone to have well-being, and it stands up better to analytical challenges than do its rivals. As a result, we advocate that administrative agencies replace cost-benefit analysis (the tool of the preference-based approach) with well-being analysis. Groundbreaking new research in hedonic psychology makes this possible, and we discuss how it can be accomplished.
And from the paper:
The problem with [Sen's objective] view [of well being] is that well-being is inherently subjective, not objective. The miserable person who uses her capabilities cannot reasonably be deemed better off than the happy person who does not. It is not clear what the metaphysical basis for Sen‟s alternative objective judgment would be; and if the judgment relies upon intuition, it comes up short by that yardstick when pitted against our happiness-based conception of welfare. It grates strongly against standard intuitions to say that a person who constantly feels awful possesses great well-being because she happens to be engaged in activities that appear on a list made by others.
Highly recommended--although (as frequent readers of LTB know) I am in complete disagreement with the claim in the passage above. Of course, the nature of welfare is a deep topic and the field of argument is highly impacted--after all this has been a subject of philosophical debate for well over 2000 years. Here are some preliminary thoughts:
The Experience Machine
BB&M
have a subjective experience view: for them all that counts is
subjective experience. There are well known thought experiments that
are designed to test the plausibility of this view (they actually go
back as far as Aristotle). John Stuart Mill has a famous version, but
a current version is provided by the plot of the film, The Matrix (and is a
riff on Robert Nozick's "experience machine"). Imagine that you are given a choice between the following two lives:
Life One:
You live in "the experience machine"--which creates a perfect illusion
of a happy life. In this life, you are subjectively satisfied in every
way. For example, you eat illusory but delicious gourmet meals
prepared by the most inventive chefs, you have illusory success in your
career, and an illusory relationship with an attractive, emotionally
compatible, and caring partner. You actual body is in fact receiving
nutrition through tubes, atrophied, pale and pasty: but you never know
this.
Life Two: You live in the actual world. In this life, you have ups and downs. Some good meals, some bad, some success, some failure, some good relationships, and some bad.
Which
of these two lives would you chose? And which life is better?
BB&M must argue that the experience-machine life would actually be the
better life in terms of welfare. Here is their discussion of a similar
example (in their hypo the two lives are identical experientially):Life Two: You live in the actual world. In this life, you have ups and downs. Some good meals, some bad, some success, some failure, some good relationships, and some bad.
[L]ife on the machine is a life that would be self-evidently
wonderful for the person living it if she were living it in the real world.
The question is whether it matters that she is living it on the machine. Our answer is that it matters, but not in terms of her welfare. Once she is attached to the machine, her welfare is unaffected by the fact of being attached to it. By hypothesis, she has no awareness that her machine-life is anything other than real. Compare two parallel lives, one in which a person eschews the machine and one in which she attaches herself to it, say at age 20. In the machine life she is enormously happy until she dies at age 100. What if she were to die tragically in the alternative real life at 21? Would the real life have been one in which she had greater welfare, one that was better for her, than the machine-life? Absolutely not. And the answer does not change if in the real life she lived until 25, or 45, or 100 and was relatively unhappy. Feeling bad or being unhappy is worse for a person than is feeling good or being happy.
The question is whether it matters that she is living it on the machine. Our answer is that it matters, but not in terms of her welfare. Once she is attached to the machine, her welfare is unaffected by the fact of being attached to it. By hypothesis, she has no awareness that her machine-life is anything other than real. Compare two parallel lives, one in which a person eschews the machine and one in which she attaches herself to it, say at age 20. In the machine life she is enormously happy until she dies at age 100. What if she were to die tragically in the alternative real life at 21? Would the real life have been one in which she had greater welfare, one that was better for her, than the machine-life? Absolutely not. And the answer does not change if in the real life she lived until 25, or 45, or 100 and was relatively unhappy. Feeling bad or being unhappy is worse for a person than is feeling good or being happy.
So far as I can discern, there is no argument here. BB&M assert that the two lives are equivalent in terms of welfare, but the question at issue is whether the concept of welfare is better understood on the objective or subjective interpretation. The assertion that welfare is unaffected (without supporting argument or reasoning) is, for that reason, question begging. The point of experience machine hypothetical is to elicit intuitions that the reality or actuality of the objective correlates that accompanies subjective experience are valuable.
The more particular move that BB&M make--imagining a long life on the machine versus a short one off of it--does not address that question. Instead, that variation on the hypothetical raises a different question: whether a life on the experience machine is better than no life at all. Arguendo, suppose that it is. And suppose further that a very short life off the experience machine is better than a full life on it. (This seems wrong to me, unless the short life is very short indeed.) This argument would simply establish that additional life with positive subjective experiences is more valuable than no life at all. And it might further establish that some loss in duration of subjectively good experience (without the objective correlates) can outweigh a shorter loss in duration of objectively good experience. But the correctness of the subjective view does not follow from that.
BB&M make another move--which is quite fair: they point out that some of our reaction to the experience machine may be a function of our subjective squeamishness about the set up. We imagine the scenes from "The Matrix" with the bodies hooked up to the machines & think "yuck." Although this move is fair, it is far from decisive. Defenders of objective value believe that their well-considered judgment is that a real life is better than an experience machine life, and would be better even if we completely discount any subjective yuckiness. BB&M have to argue that this considered judgment is simply mistaken--that those who hold are suffering from clouded judgment. But the burden on them is to show that this is so--assertion that it is so is simply question begging.
Values & the Causes of Happiness Matter
There is another line of attack on the thesis that the subjective conception of happiness is superior to the objective conception. The key to this attack is that we care about our own nature in the following way: it is important to us that we be the kinds of creatures who are made happy by the right things. Consider, for example, the following hypothetical:
Life A:
Your mental constitution is such that you are made happy by doing
evil. You like injuring others, cruelty to animals, and destroying
beauty. You live a life in which you (mistakenly) believe that you are
in fact doing great evil. Without your being aware of it, every
seeming success is actually a failure. When you kick the dog, you
actually dislodge a bone and end its great discomfort. When you
believe you are torturing a child, you are actually saving its life by
cauterizing a wound. You are subjectively happy and never realize that
your beliefs about what you have done in the world are always wrong.
Life B: Is similar to life A except that you have your actual values. You like helping others, being kind to animals, and creating beauty. You live a life in which you (correctly) believe you are doing good. Unlike life A, you correctly understand that your acts are in accord with your values. You are subjectively happy, and your subjective happiness is based on true beliefs about the world.
Life B: Is similar to life A except that you have your actual values. You like helping others, being kind to animals, and creating beauty. You live a life in which you (correctly) believe you are doing good. Unlike life A, you correctly understand that your acts are in accord with your values. You are subjectively happy, and your subjective happiness is based on true beliefs about the world.
Life A and Life B are exactly the same in terms of subjective happiness and in terms of objective effects, but they differ in with respect to what makes the life subjectively happy. In life A, subjective happiness is caused by objectively bad values. In life B, subjective happiness is caused by objectively good values. (Let us suppose for sake of argument that this plausible characterization of the values is correct.) Many readers will likely agree with my considered judgment about this case--that Life A goes very badly for you and Life B goes very well. That judgment is consistent with an objective conception of welfare that includes one's values as a component of objective value, but it cannot be accounted for by a subjective conception of welfare. The hypothetical is construed so that the subjective welfarist cannot appeal to harms to the subjective welfare of other persons or creatures--those are exactly identical.
BB&M discuss work by Nussbaum that makes a point similar to that made by the hypothetical involving Life A and Life B. Here is part of their answer to Nussbaum in the context of a discussion of racists, sexists, homophobes, and others who are made subjectively happy by discrimination against various groups:
We cannot stress strongly enough that we oppose policies catering to these
sorts of discriminatory preferences. As a starting point, we are not
even certain that those who harbor those preferences really are made
happier by the bitterness and intolerance embodied therein. But even
if those people were made happier, we are convinced that their
happiness is outweighed by the reduction in happiness that
discriminatory policies impose on others.
Just a few observations here:
First,
this answer does not apply to hypothetical involving Life A and Life
B--that hypothetical is constructed so that there is no "reduction in
happiness" that can outweigh the subjective happiness of the individual
with evil preferences in Life A. In this case, BB&M must simply
"bite the bullet" and concede that welfare is equal in the two lives.
Second, BB&M's answer concedes a great deal to Nussbaum--because its plausibility requires that we concede that the person with evil preferences is not objectively harmed by the fact that their values are distorted. Of course, BB&M themselves do not believe that there is any such harm to the welfare of the person whose values are evil, but the question at issue is whether that is true or false. Nussbaum's argument and my hypothetical are designed to elicit intuitions (which after deliberation) lead to considered judgments that BB&M are wrong about this. Even if BB&M believe that their intuitions are correct, that hardly settles the matter. At most that would lead to dialectical impasse--and the issue would have to be resolved by some other kind of argument. But if it turns out that BB&Ms are not widely shared by those who are not committed to their theoretical position (e.g. by reasonable persons who do not have "a dog in this fight") then substantial doubt is cast on their position.
Third, BB&M need to take seriously the very great importance that many humans place on having the right connection between their subjective experiences and their objective values. Consider, for example, the following thought experiment:
Many people have the sense that this transformation would result in a very great injury to them. In fact, my sense is that many people believe that this is one of the very worst things that could happen to them--even if they would actually be perfectly content and satisfied after the change occurred. Of course, BB&M can point out that this transformation is likely to result in injuries to others, but some people are likely to respond: "Yes, it might also injure others, but that is not what I am talking about. I'm saying it would harm me in a profound way."
Second, BB&M's answer concedes a great deal to Nussbaum--because its plausibility requires that we concede that the person with evil preferences is not objectively harmed by the fact that their values are distorted. Of course, BB&M themselves do not believe that there is any such harm to the welfare of the person whose values are evil, but the question at issue is whether that is true or false. Nussbaum's argument and my hypothetical are designed to elicit intuitions (which after deliberation) lead to considered judgments that BB&M are wrong about this. Even if BB&M believe that their intuitions are correct, that hardly settles the matter. At most that would lead to dialectical impasse--and the issue would have to be resolved by some other kind of argument. But if it turns out that BB&Ms are not widely shared by those who are not committed to their theoretical position (e.g. by reasonable persons who do not have "a dog in this fight") then substantial doubt is cast on their position.
Third, BB&M need to take seriously the very great importance that many humans place on having the right connection between their subjective experiences and their objective values. Consider, for example, the following thought experiment:
A
powerful being (alien, magician, or evil demon) can point a magic wand
at you that will give you inverted values. Things you now think are
good, you will think are bad. Things you now think are wrong, you will
think are right. The wand will also guarantee that your level of
subjective satisfaction will actually increase--you will experience
greater subjective feelings of well being and joy once you become evil.
Many people have the sense that this transformation would result in a very great injury to them. In fact, my sense is that many people believe that this is one of the very worst things that could happen to them--even if they would actually be perfectly content and satisfied after the change occurred. Of course, BB&M can point out that this transformation is likely to result in injuries to others, but some people are likely to respond: "Yes, it might also injure others, but that is not what I am talking about. I'm saying it would harm me in a profound way."
The Ways in Which Objective Theories of Well Being Include Subjective Experience
One more topic before, I close. It is important to understand that someone with an objective conception of welfare or well-being is not committed to the idea that subjective experiences are irrelevant. Consider the kind of neoAristotelian conception of objective welfare that I deploy in my work on virtue jurisprudence: for Aristotle, eudaimonia (or human flourishing) consists in faring well and doing well. Faring well means that the material conditions for a flourishing life must be present--a life of misery caused by great misfortune is not a happy life. Doing well means living a life of rational and social activity that expresses the human excellences--that is, the virtues. Well-functioning humans are constructed so that they are satisfied by a flourishing life: their emotional and cognitive faculties are constructed so that they take pleasure and get satisfaction from friendship, accomplishment, and other activities that express the virtues. Humans who are unable to take joy in good relationships with others or find satisfaction in a job well done are defective--they lack one element of human virtue. Similarly, humans who take joy in the suffering of others or who find greater satisfaction in failure are even more radically defective--we might call them vicious, wicked, or evil. So the contest between objective and subjective conceptions of welfare and well-being is not properly understood as a contest between the view that only subjective experience counts and only objective experience counts--both of these views are defective. Proponents of an objective theory of welfare (including theories that are in the neoAristotelian family of theories of eudaimonia) believe that subjective experience counts--but in a particular way that is dependent upon (but not reducible to) objective experience.
Read Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur!
And if this topic interests you, there will be a great panel on that will deal with this topic and others at the Law & Society meeting in Denver. 10:15am to 12:00pm on Friday, May 29: the session number is 2220 & the title is "Roundtable -- Happiness and the Law"
And if this topic interests you, there will be a great panel on that will deal with this topic and others at the Law & Society meeting in Denver. 10:15am to 12:00pm on Friday, May 29: the session number is 2220 & the title is "Roundtable -- Happiness and the Law"
