Tarunabh Khaitan (University of Oxford - Faculty of Law) has posted An Entrenched Constitution Under a Sovereign Parliament on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
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This paper argues that aspects of the UK constitution (although not the constitution as a whole) are entrenched against non-sovereign legislators such as the devolved legislatures and the Executive (in the exercise of its prerogative or delegated legislative powers). The entrenchment of constitutional rules against non-sovereign legislative power has not received the degree of scholarly attention that it deserves. This lack of attention has had serious consequences for the nature of UK public law. We have, for example, failed to consider whether, and to what extent, should the laws of the European Union be able to amend UK constitutional rules. We have also allowed judges to exercise significant powers to determine the scope of the constitution and how it should be entrenched against a given institution. This academic failure is, in part, attributable to our excessive focus on parliamentary sovereignty. This article is an attempt to begin to address this gap in the scholarship.
