Christine Jolls has posted An Analysis of Matching in the Entry-Level Academic Market on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
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This Article reports the results of an investigation of the entry-level legal academic market. My primary concern in analyzing this market is do determine how well this it succeeds in maximizing the satisfaction of candidates and faculties in their entry-level matches. The Article concludes that simple structural reforms in the entry-level legal academic job market can alleviate mismatch problems.
An ideal measure of how well this market is working might be the degree to which it maximizes the “production of truth” —a metric that, unlike the measure just noted, takes into account the overall quality of the academic system, including effects on those who are not participants in the entry-level legal academic market. It is possible, for instance, that failing to match the most desired entry-level candidates to the most desired law faculties—that is, failing to match in accordance with the parties’ preferences—actually improves the “production of truth” by harnessing the abilities of superior entry-level candidates to relatively less desired faculties. A contrary possibility is that top law entry-level candidates benefit more from the mentoring or the professional networks of highly-ranked law faculties, and this may produce broader benefits for society as these candidates pursue their scholarly projects. But since it is impossible as a practical matter to study how “mismatches” (from the perspective of faculty and applicant preferences) affect the overall quality of the system of legal knowledge production, my analysis focuses on the preference-based criterion noted above.
The results of the investigation convey a mixed message about the current market for legal academics. The confluence of so-called exploding offers and an earlier start date for the AALS FRC has moved the time of hiring forward considerably--a negative development. But many candidates decline exploding offers, and some faculties use strategic devices to counter the exploding offer tactic. Nonetheless, the net effect of the current system results in mismatch problems--where highly desirable candidates receive and accept offers from less desirable faculties. I propose a simple solution, which could be implemented by the AALS in accreditation standards. The solution resembles the National Residency Matching Prorgram used to match medical students and residency programs. This system would effectively match the most desirable entry-level candidates to the highest ranked law faculties. Although imperfect, the system would be a demonstrable improvement over the status quo.
