Re'em Segev (Hebrew University of Jerusalem – Faculty of Law) has posted Should We Prevent Deontological Wrongdoing? (Philosophical Studies, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Is there a reason to prevent deontological wrongdoing – an action that is wrong due to the violation of a decisive deontological constraint (when there is no consequential reason against it)? This question is perplexing. On the one hand, the intuitive response seems to be positive, both when the question is considered in the abstract and when it is considered with regard to paradigmatic cases of deontological wrongdoing such as Bridge and Transplant. On the other hand, common theoretical accounts of deontological wrongdoing do not entail this answer, since not preventing wrongdoing does not necessarily amount to doing harm or intending harm, for example (and, in cases in which the consequences of deontological wrongdoing are good, entail the opposite answer that preventing deontological wrongdoing in wrong). The puzzle is reinforced due to the fact that the intuitive response to other cases seems to be different, namely that there is no reason in favor of preventing deontological wrongdoing. This question is thus interesting in itself. It might also shed light on additional questions such as the “paradox of deontology” and the appropriate response to wrongful actions more generally. Yet, despite its importance, this question is typically overlooked. The paper explores this question.
A trolley is heading down the tracks and will kill five innocent people unless it is stopped. Sam could stop the trolley by shoving Irv off the bridge and onto the tracks which would block the trolley but certainly kill Irv. Sam is about to push Irv off the bridge. Now suppose that the only way to prevent Sam from pushing Irv off the bridge is to push Sam off the bridge, which would also have the effect of stopping the trolley and saving the five innocent bystanders. Is it morally permissible to push Sam off the bridge, with the intent of trying to save Irv and the foreseeable consequence of also saving the five innocent bystanders, but killing Sam--although you would hope that Sam survives the fall? Sam's being run over by the trolley is not in the causal pathway to saving Irv, but it is a foreseeable consequence.
As frequent readers of LTB know, Philippa Foot's courses at UCLA were shaping influences on my thought in general and on my development of Virtue Jurisprudence in particular. Foot, of course, is the inventor of the Trolley Problem.
