Hazel V. J. Moir (Australian National University (ANU) - Centre for European Studies, Research School of Social Sciences) has posted Pharmaceutical Patents and Evergreening on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
This paper investigates the motivations which trigger evergreening patents for pharmaceuticals and explores the characteristics of such patents, particularly their low degree of inventiveness. It starts by considering the economics of the pharmaceutical industry – the cost of developing new medicines; who pays for this research and development (R&D); what pharmaceutical revenue is spent on and how profits are used. Attention is then turned to the patent system and the leading role the pharmaceutical industry has played in designing the critical features that allow secondary patents (Section 2). Section 3 reviews in detail different types of evergreening patents, commenting on the doctrines (patent policies) which give rise to such patents. The paper concludes by looking at the impact that the industry’s focus on evergreening patents has on the incentive to develop new medicines that address unmet health needs. Given the incentive structure in patent policy the industry has managed to achieve, it is far more profitable to extend market monopolies for existing medicines, and develop variants of these, than it is to undertake riskier research to develop totally new medicines. Numerous voices have called for substantial reforms to reset the incentive structure for the pharmaceutical industry, but to date governments throughout the democratic world have been impervious to these.
