Edward B. Foley (Ohio State University (OSU) - Michael E. Moritz College of Law) has posted The Constitution and Condorcet: Democracy Protection through Electoral Reform (Drake Law Review, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
The Madisonian premises of the Constitution need modernization. This modernization, ironically, requires drawing upon the insights of Madison’s fellow Enlightenment Era political theorist, the Marquis de Condorcet. A Condorcet-based electoral system would enable the election of the candidate who is most preferred by a majority of voters, while simultaneously reducing the risk of electing authoritarian candidates who are preferred by only a minority of voters and, if given the opportunity to take power, would work to subvert the democratic choice of voters in future elections.
Not all Condorcet-based electoral systems are equally vulnerable to strategic manipulation. Given the possibility that authoritarian candidates would seek victory through an organized campaign of strategic voting, while pro-democracy candidates and voters would endeavor to defeat these authoritarian candidates by sincerely voting their preference to protect democracy, it should be recognized that some Condorcet-based electoral systems are more capable than others of foiling this kind of anti-democratic strategic voting and thereby allowing the sincere pro-democracy preferences to prevail. While the topic of “asymmetrical strategic voting” (where some candidates and voters vote strategically, while others vote sincerely) requires more development, the analysis here provides a foundation and framework for further investigation of this topic, especially in the context of how best to safeguard Madisonian republicanism from present and future threats.
Highly recommended.
