Martin S. Flaherty (Princeton University - Program in Law & Public Policy; Columbia Law School; Columbia University - Barnard College; Fordham University School of Law) has posted Rawls, Reality, and Utopia on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Measured against this standard-offering a "realistic utopia" with an eye toward international human rights law-The Law of Peoples fares better than its initial reception might suggest, yet at the end of the day proves to be inadequate, nonetheless. The balance of this essay explains the paradox. Part I considers key elements of Rawls's approach, both by Rawls himself and as enhanced by Steven Macedo. It argues that even though neither version adequately justifies premising transnational obligations upon an idea of "peoples" rather than people, Macedo's concept of self-government presents at least a plausibly utopian justification, while his emphasis on the preconditions of self-government tracks current international human rights norms in strikingly realistic ways. Part II then considers why even this enhanced account of Rawlsian thought remains insufficient. Drawing upon the critiques offered by Seyla Benhabib and Thomas Pogge, this part contends that the claims of self-governing peoples should not outweigh the prior claims of individuals as a normative matter and have already too greatly eroded as a descriptive point of international human rights. On both counts, I respectfully conclude, The Law of Peoples approach remains insufficiently utopian and inadequately realistic.
Highly recommended.
