Legal Theory Blog

Partaker on International Wildlife Crimes

Emmanuel Amanyi Ababe Partaker (Uganda Christian University) has posted A Critical Analysis of the International Legal Framework for Control of International Wildlife Crimes on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

Wildlife crime may include illegal trade, smuggling, poaching, capture or collection of endangered species or products thereof. Plants and animals all in equal measure, play a significant role in maintaining the globe bio-diversity and therefore wild life crimes play a negative part in this area.

This paper discussed the various international conventions & organizations bent on control of international wildlife crime. It also discussed the control measures under taken to curb international wild crimes, the challenges thereto plus recommendations.

Ries on Drag Bans and the First Amendment

Brett V. Ries (Duke University School of Law, Students) has posted Don't Be A Drag: How Drag Bans Can Violate the First Amendment on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

Drag is currently under attack in the United States, and anti-drag violence is increasing. As part of the attack on drag, state governments across the country are attempting to ban or restrict drag performances. At the root of these restrictions and oppositions to drag is ultimately lawmakers’ disapproval with the inherent message drag sends: that gender nonconformity is okay. This Note makes the argument as to why drag is expressive conduct that inherently contains a viewpoint on gender norms. Then, by pulling themes from recent anti-drag legislation, this Note lays out the relevant First Amendment tests and then applies them to drag restrictions to analyze whether these restrictions pass constitutional muster. It argues that while some types of drag performances may be constitutionally restricted, such restrictions would ultimately only cover a small amount of what drag can be.

Drag can and has moved audiences and liberated individuals. It spreads a message of love and acceptance across the country and the world. People do not have to agree with that message or expression, including government officials. But, if the Supreme Court has made anything clear in its First Amendment cases, it is that the government cannot prohibit expression just because it disagrees with the message. Drag artists should continue to share their art and spread their messages, reaffirming our country’s commitment to freedom of expression.

Sokol & Wickelgren on the Federal Trade Commission and Antitrust Enforcement

D. Daniel Sokol (USC Gould School of Law; USC Marshall School of Business) & Abraham L. Wickelgren (University of Texas at Austin - School of Law; University of Texas at Austin - Center for Law, Business, and Economics) have posted Agency Objectives, Organizational Change, and Optimizing Enforcement (Journal of Antitrust Enforcement (Forthcoming)) on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

Effective antitrust relies on its institutions. We offer a brief retrospective of sudden and significant change at one of the antitrust institutions in the United States – the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) under the Biden administration. Changes under Chair Lina Khan have been more dramatic than at any time since the 1981 tenure of Chair James Miller. Much like Miller, changes in the agency have been fast and far reaching. Perhaps different than the Miller revolution has been a difference between rhetoric and reality on substance, as well as more significant disregard for transparency and managerial issues that reduce informed decision-making. Some of the managerial problems have improved over time, but a number of these issues remain significant. Overall, our view is that effective enforcement requires solving a series of principle agent problems internally as well as reducing regulatory uncertainty when such uncertainty could chill pro-competitive behavior and innovation.

Shoemaker on Indigenous Land Reform

Jessica A. Shoemaker (University of Nebraska - College of Law) has posted Land Reform in the Fifth World (52 Southwestern Law Review 239 (Forthcoming)) on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

In this time of rapid climate change and gaping inequality, we face urgent questions about the ability of current property systems to sustain us into the future. But how does property-system change happen? Land reform is difficult to imagine, much less implement, within a physical landscape already so lavishly built and also embedded with deep layers of tradition, experience, and law. In this short Essay, I argue that there are important lessons from Ezra Rosser’s recent book, A Nation Within: Navajo Land and Economic Development, for the wider project of Indigenous and, ultimately, American land reform. Property scholars ignore these issues of Indigenous property and land governance to our collective detriment.

This Essay makes three particular contributions. First, I outline with some specificity why centering contemporary Indigenous land tenures within any wider study of America’s already pluralistic property system is so important. Second, building on Rosser’s detailed case study of Navajo land and economic development, I draw some wider lessons about the process of how land reform happens. Although law change is needed to implement many desired innovations, the Navajo experience underlines the critical role of local action, imagination, and persistence. Finally, the Essay takes a brief journey to review the experience of some First Nations in Canada—where Indigenous-led land reforms are also being pursued in a similar but different context—to expand on ideas about the architecture of successful land reform projects. When we widen our scholarly attention—humbly, and with respect—we find an abundance of critical, active land-reform projects that are ongoing and worthy of greater care and concern as we reimagine our future together in this world, and maybe the next.

Sangiuliano on Harmless Discrimination

Anthony Sangiuliano (Cornell University - Sage School of Philosophy) has posted Harmless Discrimination, Wrongs, and Rules (Law & Philosophy, forthcoming) on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

Discrimination is often tremendously harmful. But cases of harmless, yet morally wrongful discrimination suggest that there are factors that make discrimination wrong other than its harmfulness. This article analyzes three views that resist this conclusion and poses some challenges for each. The first view appeals to unnoticed forms of harm in cases of harmless discrimination. But it counterintuitively entails that discriminatory acts are morally wrong by definition. The second view holds that harmless discrimination is made wrong by how its perpetrator wrongs the victim by disrespecting her moral status without setting back her wellbeing. But it is unclear how impermissibly wronging a person is different from unjustifiably harming her. The third view holds that, even if discriminatory acts can be made wrong by factors other than harm, they ought to be prohibited by a legal rule whose sole justification is that it prevents harm. But there may be reasons for legally prohibiting discriminatory acts other than harm prevention.

Recommended.

McNeill & Tucker on Constitutional Positivism

David N. McNeill & Emily Tucker (Center on Privacy & Technology at Georgetown Law) have posted The Shape of Citizenship: Extraordinary Common Meaning and Constitutional Legitimacy on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

The United States, it is widely believed, is at a moment of constitutional crisis. At no time since the Civil War era has it seemed more likely that what James Madison called the “experiment entrusted to the hands of the American people”—the experiment in democratic constitutional self-governance—will fail. This article argues that one reason for this state of affairs is that the ‘people’ sense that they are no longer active participants in the experiment. While the historical etiology of this crisis is complex, and the forces involved not confined to the US, this article focuses on the crisis in the legitimacy of the Federal Judiciary—and the role that current orthodoxies in constitutional interpretation have played in fomenting that crisis.

The immediate critical target of this article is contemporary jurisprudential uses of what is called “public meaning originalism,” specifically, and ‘textualist originalism’ more broadly, as a theory for the interpretation of those clauses in the US Constitution that refer to fundamental rights and freedoms. This concern with “textualism,” however, is primarily diagnostic. For, despite its relative unpopularity among most contemporary legal theorists, the application of “public meaning originalism” by the US Supreme Court is perfectly consistent with the dominant legal theoretical approach in the English-speaking world. The extremity of the Court’s recent ‘textualist’ jurisprudence provides an excellent illustration, or reminder, of the dangers of legal positivist jurisprudence. In arguing against textualist originalism, this article defends a version of the anti-positivist distinction between legal rules and legal principles, most famously associated with the work of Ronald Dworkin. It argues, however, that this distinction cannot be captured by understanding constitutional principles in terms of moral principles, as Dworkin suggests. Instead, constitutional principles must be understood as deliberative principles of political association and communal self-determination. The primary subject of this article, then, is the character of fundamental constitutional law; our hope is that the current crises in democratic constitutional legitimacy can help make salient certain aspects of the relation between popular sovereignty and constitutional legitimacy that are harder to discern in less fractured political climates.

This article begins, in Part One, with a consideration of the Roberts Court’s recent jurisprudence, focusing on three landmark opinions issued in June of 2022: Dobbs v Jackson Women’s Health Organization, Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist. and West Virginia v EPA. The point of revisiting this recent history will not be—or will not only be—to decry these rulings as anti-democratic and constitutionally ill-founded. The point, rather, will be 1) to see these rulings as consolidations of the Court’s newly asserted constitutional authority, and 2) show how contemporary positivist constitutional theory has helped prepare the way for the Court’s manipulation of the constitutional order.

Part Two begins to elaborate an anti-positivist alternative both to legal positivism and to natural law legal theory. In agreement with traditional natural law theorists, it is argued that the distinction between illegitimate and legitimate expressions of political authority depends on the degree to which a system of authority is directed toward a common good. In disagreement with those theorists, however, this article contends that the common good of a political community is determined by the communal deliberative activity of a political community, and that the deliberative determination of a common good is the normative foundation of that community.

Part Three focuses on the First Amendment of the US Constitution with two aims in mind. First, to illustrate the account of constitutional law here advocated, it offers a reading of the First Amendment as an attempt to put into words a shared understanding among the ratifiers of the Bill of Rights of what this article calls ‘the shape of citizenship’ in our constitutional democracy. Second, it shows how the Court’s recent opinions have radically subverted the last vestiges of this original connection between constitutional rights and the foundational principles of constitutional self-government. In Dobbs v Jackson, in particular, the Court asserts an understanding of constitutional rights as merely a particular structural variant of positive law, and in so doing effectively makes the legal order a sovereign power over the people, rather than an expression of and vehicle for their common self-determination.

Sevel on the Rule of Law at Sea

Michael Sevel (The University of Sydney - Faculty of Law) has posted Maritime Rule of Law: Some Preliminaries (Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 2023) on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

Can there be rule of law at sea? In extending the traditionally terrene ideal seaward, there are a range of conceptual difficulties. These difficulties are outlined, and a recurring thought pattern is set out that is found in the traditions of thought about the rule of law as protecting members of a community from the abuse of power. Drawing on Jeremy Bentham’s scattered remarks about maritime governance, three assumptions underlying this thought pattern, regarding territoriality, community, and protective function, are identified as requiring modification in the maritime context. Achievement of the rule of law at sea is possible, but reflects a number of limitations as compared to its terrene counterpart, limitations related to these three traditional assumptions.

Legal Theory Lexicon: Speech Acts

Introduction

Speech act theory will forever be associated with the great J. L. Austin, the Oxford philosopher whose work in the 1950s had an enormous influence on analytic and Anglophone philosophy. One of Austin's core insights is reflected in the title of his William James lectures, delivered at Harvard in 1955, How to Do Things with Words.  When we use language, we don't just communicate information or say things about how the world is; when we use language, we do things. We command, request, apologize, contract, convey, and admonish. Speech act theory focuses on the ways in which language (both oral and written) can be used to perform actions.

Legal theorists are interested in speech act theory for a variety of reasons, but one of the most important is that speech act theory helps to explain the way that the law uses language. Statutes, holdings, and constitutional provisions aren't like "the cat is on the mat." That is, a statute does not tell us how the world is in the same way that a declaratory sentence does. Legal language is full of speech acts. This entry in the Legal Theory Lexicon provides a rough and ready introduction to speech act theory pitched at law students (especially first-year law students) with an interest in legal theory.
 

Sentences, Propositions, Meaning, and Truth

There are lots of ways we could start, but let's begin with a simple sentence. "The sidebar of Legal Theory Blog contains a link to Balkinization." What does this sentence mean? One answer to that question is pretty straightforward. There is an object in the world (the sidebar of legal theory blog) and that object includes another, "a link to Balkinization." Simple declarative sentences like this have truth values (or are "truth-apt"). In this case, the sentence is false, because the sidebar to Legal Theory Blog actually does no longer has links to other blogs and hence no link to Balkinization. There is a temptation to think that all sentences are like simple declarative sentences in that (1) the meaning of the sentence can be cashed out by the way it refers to the actual world, and (2) if the sentence is meaningful (i.e. it succeeds in referring), then the sentence has a truth value.

O.K., that was a lot to swallow, but what does it have to do with "speech acts"? Now, take this expression in English: "Please add my blog to your blogroll." Does this sentence refer to anything? Well, it does include elements that refer, e.g. "my blog" and "your blogroll." But this sentence doesn't assert that my blog is on your blogroll. It may imply that my blog currently is not on your blogroll, but that implicit assertion doesn't exhaust its meaning. The sentence "Please add my blog to your blogroll" is a request. By uttering (or posting) these words, I am making a request. If you do add my blog to your blogroll, the request will succeed. If you don't, the request will have failed. Although the request can succeed or fail, it would be strange indeed to say that "Please add my blog to your blogroll" is either true or false. Requests are not truth-apt; they do not bear truth values.

Are there any other types of expressions that are similar to requests? Once we start looking, we will discover lots and lots. Orders, questions, offers, acceptances, warnings, invitations, greetings, welcomes, thank yous--all of these are types of expressions that do not seem to refer or to have truth values. What do these expressions mean then, if they don't refer? When I gave an order, I perform an action--the act of ordering X to do Y. When I make an offer, I perform an action--the act of creating a legally effective option for the offeree to form a legally binding contract by accepting the offer. When I extend an invitation to a party, I perform an action--the act of inviting person P to event E. Speech act theory begins with the idea that language can be used to perform actions.

Form and Function

We might be tempted to think that we can tell the difference between sentences that describe the world and expressions that perform actions simply by their form. So we might be tempted to say, "Sentences of the form X is Y express propositions that refer," whereas sentences of the form, "I hereby do X" perform a speech act. But language is much messier than this. Take the sentence, "This room is a pig sty." In some contexts, this sentence might be referential. If one were taking a tour of an animal husbandry research facility, the sentence "This room is a pig sty" might express a true proposition about the function of a particular room. But if the same words were used by a parent, in an annoyed tone, and directed to a teenage child, the real meaning of the expression might be, "Clean up your room!" Certain forms are characteristically associated with propositions that refer and others with the performance of speech acts, but the question of meaning depends on the context of utterance. 

Utterance, Locution, Illocution, Perlocution

With the basic idea of a speech act under out belts, we can now introduce a useful set of terminological distinctions:

• Utterance--We can use the term "utterance" to refer to the words (e.g. the sounds or letters) that constitute a particular use of language.
• Locution--We can use the term "locution" to refer to the semantic meaning of the utterance.
• Illocution--We can use the term "illocution" to refer to the speech act that is performed by use of a particular utterance in a particular context.
• Perlocution--We can use the term "perlocution" to refer to the effect that a given expression has when it is uttered in a particular context.

Take the example of the sentence, "This room is a pig sty." The utterance is simply the words that are used: suppose this is an oral statement in English made by a parent to a child on a particular occasion. The same parent could utter similar worlds in English (or another language) that have the same semantic content. "The family room is a pig sty"--would express the same propositional content as "This room is a pig sty" if "this room" was "the family room." The illocutionary force of this statement is ambiguous. If the child spoken to was responsible for the mess, then both parent and child might understand that "This room is a pig sty" is the equivalent of "Clean up this room." The same illocutionary force can be obtained by a variety of expressions. Finally, the perlocutionary effect of "This room is a pig sty" will also depend on context. The effect might be to produce shame, but it might also produce anger. Thus, one utterance has both locutionary content, illocutionary force, and perlocutionary effect.

A Typology of Speech Acts

One of the tasks of speech act theory has been to develop typologies of speech acts. Here is one typology developed by Bach and Hamish:

• Constatives: affirming, alleging, announcing, answering, attributing, claiming, classifying, concurring, confirming, conjecturing, denying, disagreeing, disclosing, disputing, identifying, informing, insisting, predicting, ranking, reporting, stating, stipulatin
• Directives: advising, admonishing, asking, begging, dismissing, excusing, forbidding, instructing, ordering, permitting, requesting, requiring, suggesting, urging, warning
• Commissives: agreeing, guaranteeing, inviting, offering, promising, swearing, volunteering
• Acknowledgments: apologizing, condoling, congratulating, greeting, thanking, accepting (acknowledging an acknowledgment)

There are other ways of slicing and dicing the types of speech acts, but Bach and Hamish's typology gives a good sense of how such a typology might work.

Speech Act Theory and Legal Theory

How can legal theorists use speech act theory?  We could start by noting the important role that speech acts play in the law. Laws themselves might be seen as speech acts--as types of commands or authorizations. In contract law, issues of contract formation frequently turn on questions whether particular utterances were speech acts of particular types. Was this utterance an offer? Was that statement an acceptance? In a very general way, speech act theory is helpful simply because it allows us to understand legal phenomena from a new angle.

Speech act theory may also be helpful in resolving particular sorts of doctrinal puzzles. For example, in the theory of the freedom of speech, one might be puzzled about the unprotected status of certain expressions. Oral contracts are speech. Threats are speech. An order from a Mafia boss to a hitman is speech. But no one thinks that these instances of speech raise serious questions under the First Amendment.

Why not?  One possible answer to this question could begin with "marketplace of ideas" theory of free speech famously associated with Justice Holmes--a theory that emphasizes the role of freedom of speech in facilitating the emergence of truth from the unrestricted public debate and discussion. Directive speech acts, such as orders, do not make truth claims, and hence might be entirely outside the freedom of speech. But constantive speech acts, such as affirming, conjecturing, or disagreeing, do make speech claims and hence would raise free speech issues on the marketplace of ideas theory. Of course, one paragraph does not a theory of the freedom of speech make--for more on this, see my Freedom of Communicative Action.

Here is another example. The hearsay rule is notoriously difficult to conceptualize precisely, because the canonical formulation, that hearsay is "an out-of-court declaration introduced for the truth of the matter asserted," is not transparent. Speech act theory may perform a clarifying function. The phrase "out of court declaration" may be clarified by reference to the categories of speech acts: out-of-court declarations are constantive speech acts. Other categories of speech acts, e.g. directives, commisives, and acknowledgements, are not declarations. Moreover, the phrase "for the truth of the matter asserted" may be illuminated by distinguishing propositional contents which may bear truth values, on the one hand, and illocutionary force and perlocutionary effects on the others. The hearsay rule is usually not violated if an out-of-court declaration is introduced for the purpose of demonstrating its illocutionary force. For example, a third party can testify to the making of an oral contract for the purpose of showing that the action--making the contract--was performed.

If you are interested in acquiring a very basic knowledge of speech act theory, I recommend that you start with Austin's marvelous How to Do Things with Words. Although many of Austin's particular points have been criticized or superceded by subsequent work, this is a marvelous book--concise, illuminating, and a model of ordinary language philosophy at its best. More advanced readings are included in the bibliography below.

Related Lexicon Entries

• Legal Theory Lexicon 063: Interpretation and Construction
  

 Bibliography

• Austin, J. L. (1962) How to Do Things with Words: Second Edition (William James Lectures) , Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
• Bach, K. and R. M. Harnish (1979), Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts , Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
• Grice, H. P. (1989) Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
• Searle, J. (1969) Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press.
• Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 Northwestern University Law Review 54 (1988 1989).
• Strawson, P. F. (1964) 'Intention and convention in speech acts', Philosophical Review 73: 439-60.

Resources on the Internet

• Mitchell Green, "Speech Acts" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• Kent Bach, "Speech Acts" entry in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• What Is a Speech Act?
• Kepa Korta, "Pragmatics" entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Barry Smith, Towards a History of Speech Act Theory
• Guy Longworth, "John Langshaw Austin" entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Phiosophy

(Last modified on May 19, 2023.)

Legal Theory Bookworm: "Feminist Theory and International Law" by Jones

The Legal Theory Bookworm recommends Feminist Theory and International Law by Emily Jones.  Here is a description:

Feminist approaches to international law have been mischaracterised by the mainstream of the discipline as being a niche field that pertains only to women’s lived experiences and their participation in decision-making processes. Exemplifying how feminist approaches can be used to analyse all areas of international law, this book applies posthuman feminist theory to examine the regulation of new and emerging military technologies, international environmental law and the conceptualisation of the sovereign state and other modes of legal personality in international law.

Noting that most posthuman scholarship to date is primarily theoretical, this book also contributes to the field of posthumanism through its application of posthuman feminism to international law, working to bridge the theory and practice divide by using posthuman feminism to design and call for legal change. This interdisciplinary book draws on an array of fields, including philosophy, queer and feminist theories, postcolonial and critical race theories, computer science, critical disability studies, science and technology studies, marine biology, cultural and media studies, Indigenous onto-epistemologies, critical legal theory, political science and beyond to provide a holistic analysis of international law and its inclusions and exclusions.

This interdisciplinary book will appeal to students and scholars with interests in legal, feminist and posthuman theory, as well as those concerned with the contemporary challenges faced by international law.

Download of the Week: "Textualism’s Fault Lines" by Krishnakumar

The Download of the Week is Textualism’s Fault Lines by Anita S. Krishnakumar.  Here is the abstract:

It is by now axiomatic to note that textualism has won the statutory interpretation wars. But contrary to what textualists long have promised, the widespread embrace of textualism as an interpretive methodology has not resulted in any real clarity or predictability about the interpretive path—or even the specific interpretive tools—that courts will invoke in a particular case. Part of the reason for this lack of predictability is that textualism-in-practice often differs significantly from the approach that textualism-in-theory advertises; and part of the reason is that textualism-in-theory is sometimes in tension with itself. In light of textualism’s ascendance—and now dominance—on the modern Supreme Court, it is time for scholars and jurists to grapple with these theoretical tensions and points of divergence between textualist interpretive theory and practice.

This article provides the first empirical and doctrinal analysis of three central fault lines, or places where modern textualist interpretive practice diverges—sometimes sharply—from textualist interpretive theory. Based on 637 cases decided during the Roberts Court’s first fifteen-and-a-half terms, this article highlights three surprising textualist fault lines: (1) first, while textualism-in-theory seeks to limit the universe of acceptable interpretive resources upon which judges rely, textualist interpretive practice is decidedly pluralist, as a clear majority of the Court—including all of the Justices widely considered to be textualists—regularly references several interpretive tools that textualism-in-theory rejects; (2) second, while textualism-in-theory insists that statutory terms be given their date-of-enactment or “original public” meaning, textualism-in-practice regularly uses present-day sources to determine statutory meaning; and (3) third, while textualism-in-theory emphasizes the meaning that statutory terms have in everyday conversational speech, textualism-in-practice relies heavily on sophisticated legal doctrines and constructs. These findings hold true even if we focus exclusively on data from the Court’s most recent 2017-2020 terms, during which the Court’s composition has skewed lopsidedly textualist.

After chronicling these divergences between textualist theory and practice, the article considers and rejects the possibility that they may be attributed merely to faint-hearted judicial application of textualism and that they should be resolved through more disciplined adherence to textualist principles. Instead, the article suggests that textualist interpretive theory may actually be inherently contradictory in ways that give rise to these interpretive divergences; for example, textualism’s commitment to stability may be in tension with its commitment to predictability and fair notice. In the end, the article offers some suggestions for how textualist theory might evolve to both reconcile these internal contradictions and to better account for how textualism actually is practiced on the ground.

Highly recommended.